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US and capital flight
by

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah*

The article explains the development of tax evasion after the USA abolished
withholding on interest in 1984. After the financial crisis of 2008, the USA
adopted fatca, which was followed by a worldwide adoption of automatic
information-exchange mechanisms.
Introduction. A. The Development of the Problem; 1. 1984-2000; 2.
2000–2010; 3. 2010-2018. B. A Modest Proposal. C. Conclusion

Introduction
The recent leaks of the Panama and Paradise Papers have highlighted the difficulty of
taxing the income of residents of developed and developing offshore countries. The
basic problem is that such income is subject to neither withholding at source nor
information reporting. In the absence of both withholding and reporting, it is easy to use
tax havens to hide such income from tax authorities. Estimates of the scope of the
problem vary widely, but it is certainly larger than the $200 billion in estimated losses
from legal corporate tax avoidance.
This article explains the historic roots of this problem, which dates back to the 1984
unilateral US decision to abolish withholding on portfolio interest. It then suggests a
coordinated, refundable withholding tax scheme to be imposed by the USA, EU, and
Japan, which are the main destinations of portfolio investments. No cooperation by tax
havens is needed for such a scheme. Finally, the article addresses some common
counter arguments.

A. The Development of the Problem
_____________________________________
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1. 1984-2000
In 1984, the United States terminated its tax treaty with the Netherlands Antilles. The
reason was that the Treaty (technically, an extension of the US-Netherlands Treaty) had
become a “treaty with the world”: Namely, every US multinational entity could set up a
finance subsidiary in the Antilles and use it to borrow funds from investors regardless
of their country of residence, secure in knowing that there would be no withholding tax
levied on interest payments under Article 11 of the Treaty. 1 The USA became
concerned that no country would be interested in negotiating tax treaties with it if its
residents could use the Antilles Treaty.
However, the termination of the Treaty also caused concerns: How could the US
Government (which was running a large budget deficit) and corporations continue to
borrow from overseas investors, if interest is subject to a 30% withholding tax? One
answer was that investors from treaty countries already benefitted from a lower tax rate
(typically 10%, or even 0%). If the lower rate depended on a treaty, however, foreign
investors would potentially be subject to the exchange of information provision (Article
26), which could mean that they would have to declare the US-source interest income in
their country of residence.
The solution was to adopt the portfolio interest exemption, under which interest
paid by US entities (the US Treasury and US corporations, as well as US banks and
other financial institutions) to lenders that do not own 10% of the stock of the payor is
unilaterally exempt from withholding tax.2 This enabled US entities to borrow without
paying withholding tax (which is typically shifted to the borrower, since interest rates
are set on the global market) without jeopardizing tax evasion by the lender, since the
exemption does not depend on the Treaty, so no information needed to be collected by
the payors and no information was available for exchange with residence countries.
The result was astonishing: Latin American countries alone invested more than
$300 billion in the USA – a sum that exceeded all of the official aid that Latin American
countries received during the entire 1980s. As admitted by Charles McLure, then
deputy assistant secretary for tax analysis, this was not foreseen by the US Treasury and
caused massive damage to developing countries.3 In addition, tax competition ensured
_____________________________________
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For an example of how this was done see Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v.
Comm’r, 115 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1997), in which the court approved this arrangement.
26 CFR Section 871(h).
Charles E. McLure, “Remarks at the VIIIth Munich Symposium on International
Taxation” (1989), reprinted in Munich Symposium on Int’l Taxation, Influence of Tax

2

US and capital flight

דין ודברים יב תשע"ט

that ever since 1984, no developed country was able to collect withholding tax on
interest paid to non-residents because if it tried to do so, the funds would be shifted to
the USA. The USA and other OECD members have since benefitted from massive
inflows of portfolio investment that is exempt of taxation at source and that is generally
not declared at residence, which left trillions of income dollars untaxed.4
Nevertheless, the USA was concerned from the beginning that the portfolio interest
exemption might be used by US citizens and residents to move funds out of the USA
and then reinvest them in US bonds via a tax secrecy jurisdiction. Subsequently, the US
Government took several steps to combat potential tax evasion by Americans: It
severely restricted “bearer bonds” that are not in registered form, and required that
bonds issued by US corporations in Europe bear a legend that states they are not
intended for sale to US citizens. In addition, the portfolio interest exemption itself
contains a provision that allows the US Treasury to suspend its application to countries
that do not participate in information exchange.5
These steps proved insufficient. Bearer bonds survived on the Eurobond market, the
legend was not enough because it did not apply to secondary bond sales, and the
exchange of information limitation was never applied to the portfolio interest
exemption.

2. 2000–2010
To improve the policing of withholding, the USA adopted the Qualified Intermediary
(QI) Program in the early 2000s. Under the QI Program, banks could qualify as QIs by
signing an agreement to validate the identity of their customers. Then, they would give
the information to US withholding agents, but only in aggregate form (a given amount
_____________________________________
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Differentials on International Competitiveness (1990) P.55: “I must admit that, as
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury at the time this action [the adoption of the
portfolio interest exemption] was taken, I did not fight early enough, long enough, or
hard enough against its enactment”, mostly because of the effect on Latin American
countries. See also: Charles E. McLure, Jr., “U.S. Tax Laws and Capital Flight from
Latin America”, 20 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 321 (1989), pp. 349–350.
No one knows precisely how many trillions because the activity is illegal. Global
Financial Integrity estimated the total funds in offshore financial centers at $11.5
trillion, including $1 trillion per year from developing countries, $500 billion of which
in invested in OECD countries.
26 CFR Section 871(h)(6).
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subject to 0% withholding, another to 10%, another to 15%, etc.), without revealing the
actual identities of the beneficiaries to anyone in the US. The reason for the latter
provision, of course, was to make sure that the information was not available to the IRS
for exchange under treaties, and thus could not be used by other countries to combat tax
evasion by their residents.
The 2009 UBS scandal showed that the QI Program was also insufficient in
preventing “round tripping” by US citizens. The UBS sent representatives to visit US
locations where the rich congregate and persuade them to set up corporations in tax
havens such as the Caymans. These corporations then deposited funds with UBS Zurich,
which in turn invested them in the US. UBS claimed that the QI agreement it signed did
not require the disclosure of any such information to the IRS as long as the accounts
belonged to tax-haven-based corporations, even though it knew that the corporations
were owned by US citizens.

3. 2010-2018
The result was the enactment of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 2010
(FATCA), under which any “foreign financial institution” (FFI) must take affirmative
steps to discover who among its depositors is a US citizen or resident and disclose that
information directly to the IRS. The penalty for not doing so is a hefty 30% withholding
tax on any US source income earned by the FFI. Since most FFIs are exposed to the US
market in some way, this Act has real teeth. To lighten the compliance burden, the USA
is negotiating Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) with several foreign governments
with which it has tax treaties under which the foreign government should collect
requisite information from its FFIs and share it with the US.6
What this saga shows is that the attempt by the USA to aid and abet tax evasion by
foreign residents investing in the USA backfired because it enabled US citizens to
pretend they were foreigners and benefit from provisions that were meant to attract real
foreigners (no collection of information and no withholding). The same problem gave
rise to the recent revelations in the Panama and Paradise Papers of the scope of US
citizens’ investments in the USA through tax havens.
_____________________________________

6

Under the Model I IGA, like the one between the US and the UK, information
gathering is supposed to be reciprocal, and the USA now requires that US banks
collect the information necessary to exchange under IGA. Model II IGAs are
non-reciprocal (only the USA obtains information) but no such IGAs have been
negotiated.

4

דין ודברים יב תשע"ט

US and capital flight

The same thing happened in Europe. The German Government worried that
German residents had deposited money in Luxembourgian banks and then invested it in
Germany. The attempt to impose a withholding tax resulted in capital flight to
Switzerland. Limitations imposed on the deductibility of interest paid to related foreign
parties were struck down by the European Court of Justice, and the German
Constitutional Court ruled that imposing withholding on wages but not on interest
violates the equal protection principle. The Germans then turned to the EU and
managed to get it to adopt a Savings Directive in 2003. Under that Savings Directive,
all EU members must either share information or impose a withholding tax on
payments to residents of other member states. That directive, however, does not apply
to investments by non-EU residents (e.g., Americans), so EU residents can likewise
avoid it by pretending to be non-residents.

B.

A Modest Proposal

The solution to this problem is simple. Money cannot stay in tax havens because they
do not offer sufficient investment opportunities. It has to be invested in OECD-member
countries, particularly in the USA, the EU, and Japan. If these three jurisdictions
cooperated by imposing either information reporting or a withholding tax on all
payments to foreigners, instead of the EU abetting tax evasion by Americans and the
US by Europeans, everyone would be better off. That would make it impossible for US
residents to evade taxation by pretending to be Europeans, and for Europeans to evade
taxation by pretending to be Americans. Everyone would declare their income to their
country of residence or be subject to withholding tax (which can be made refundable if
subjects prove that their income had been declared in the country of residence).
FATCA offers a preliminary step in this direction. Under the IGAs, foreign
governments must collect information on US citizens investing in their FFIs. In
exchange, these governments will receive information about their residents'
investments in US financial institutions. For the first time ever, US banks will be forced
to gather information on payments made free of withholding tax under the portfolio
interest exemption.
Now we finally address developing countries. As indicated by the capital flight to
Miami after 1984, a large chunk of the funds invested in the USA without the exchange
of information come from the wealthy elites of developing countries. If the USA agreed
with other OECD countries to implement a global savings directive for their residents
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by signing IGAs with those countries, it should be possible to extend it to non-OECD
countries as well. If the USA and the EU cooperated, the former could simply abolish
the portfolio interest exemption (or declare that it does not apply to non-Treaty
countries; and it has the power to do so under current laws). If the EU cooperates, the
money would not escape to other OECD countries. The USA can then offer developing
countries the information they need to tax their own wealthy residents or impose a
withholding tax on payments to such residents (which again could be made refundable
by intergovernmental agreements). The end result would be a global and automatic
exchange of information, which should enable each country to tax its own residents.
The USA has learned the hard way that trying to attract foreign capital by not
withholding or gathering information is a recipe for undermining the taxation of
Americans. FATCA now offers a forward way to cooperate with other countries that
wish to tax their wealthy residents on all income “from whatever source derived.” This
shows that even in a world with capital mobility, it is possible for countries to tax
income from capital if they learn to cooperate with each other. It remains to be seen
whether recent revelations (such as the Paradise Papers) will finally result in
meaningful EU and US attempts to crack down on tax evasion that everyone concedes
is illegal.

C. Conclusion
It has been argued that countries’ cooperation on tax matters is unlikely because interest
rates vary too much. Still, even though we have witnessed the development of
cooperative solutions for tax evasion problems in the CRS and for tax avoidance
problem in BEPS, both efforts are flawed. The basic problem is that the cooperation of
too many countries is required. CRS is an attempt to enforce a residence-based taxation
of passive income, but just one non-cooperating tax haven can ruin the entire system
because all income can be routed through it. BEPS is an attempt to enforce
source-based taxation of active income, but there are too many source countries outside
OECD/G20 to impose such standards universally. In both cases, the USA is not
cooperative.
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Instead, I would suggest reversing the traditional preference and taxing active
income primarily at residence and passive income primarily at source.7 The G20 are
home to most multinationals, and if they could coordinate the current taxation of their
residents worldwide, the BEPS problem could be eliminated.
Passive income, as explained above, must not remain in tax havens, but should be
invested in large and stable jurisdictions. That is why a cooperative solution involving
just the USA, the EU, and Japan is feasible. Given the huge sums involved, it should be
possible for these three jurisdictions to cooperate by imposing refundable withholding
tax on all outbound payments to countries that do not engage in a meaningful exchange
of information (i.e., tax havens).

_____________________________________
Reuven Avi-Yonah, "Evaluating BEPS: A Reconsideration of the Benefits Principle
and Proposal for UN Oversight", 6 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. (2016) 185 (with H. Xu).
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